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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CIVIL PROCEDURE
PLEADING REQUISITES TO SUFFICIENTLY STATE SLANDER ACTION DEFENSE
In Cheatum v. Wehie plaintiff, a Civil Service employee in the State Con-
servation Department, brought an action for slander against the State Conser-
vation Commissioner.1 At a dinner which was attended by over 150 persons
defendant had allegedly charged plaintiff with "deliberate sabotage or gross
neglect" in reference to an experimental wildlife project which had failed.2
From adverse orders of the Supreme Court, Special Term and the Appellate
Division, defendant appealed upon a series of five defenses of which the
defenses of "fair comment" and immunity from suit based upon "official
privilege," were considered extensively by the Court.
The Court found that the defense of fair comment should not have been
stricken as a complete defense. Disagreeing with Judge Dye's opinion that
the defendant must "plead the truth of the statement," the majority found
that, where the alleged defamation consisted of an opinion based upon certain
facts, it was enough that the defendant allege the facts to be true and that
the comment was warranted by those facts. The truth of the statement must
be pleaded only when the defense is that of "justification," for then defendant
avers that the statement is one of fact and not opinion. In asserting the
defense of fair comment, the defendant must also allege that he acted in good
faith, believing the statement to be true.4 These allegations were contained
in defendant's answer. Fair comment was a complete defense to the action if
the statement was based upon true facts, and the opinion drawn thereon was
reasonable and justified.
The general rule is that in the case of a slanderous statement the law
implies malice.5 However, where the statement is made within the purview of
some privilege, such as fair comment, the comment remains "fair" in absence
of a showing of actual malice, and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show
such malice. Therefore, a jury must determine whether there was fair comment
or malicious slander.6
In order to effectuate the administration of public affairs, an executive
official is clothed with an "absolute privilege," and immunity from prosecution,
for publishing false and defamatory statements made in the exercise of his
executive functions.7 The courts have recognized an extention of the policy of
absolute privilege to situations where the administration of executive functions
1. 5 N.Y.2d 585, 186 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1959).
2. The Commissioner was the guest of honor at a dinner attended by local sportsmen,
civic and business leaders, members of the press and sports writers.
3. Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911).
4. Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 235 N.Y. Supp. 340 (1st Dep't 1929);
Briarcliff Lodge Hotel v. Citizen-Sentinel Publishers, 260 N.Y. 106, 183 N.E. 193 (1932);
Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930).
5. Byam v. Collins, 111 N.Y. 143, 19 N.E. 75 (1888); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920).
6. Byam v. Collins, supra note 5.
7. Hemmons v. Nelson, 138 N.Y. 517, 34 N.E. 342 (1893).
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is not the primary motivation of certain communications, but where there is
a common interest between the communicating parties, and the one owes at
least a moral or social duty to the other. Such a privilege is deemed "qualified,"
because it does not extend beyond such good faith statements as are made in
the performance of his duty and believed to be true.8 The Commissioner had
two opportunities to make an official report upon his theory regarding the
failure of the wildlife project, and thus could have acted within the absolute
privilege accorded him. He neglected to make mention of it in his annual
report to the Governor and the Legislature, and also in the then current issue
of the Conservationist, an official magazine published by the Conservation
Department. Since the Commissioner had a ready, effective and legal means
of handling the situation, such a filing charges and giving the plaintiff an op-
portunity to be heard, the Court could see no need to extend a qualified
privilege under the circumstances in which this statement was made. The
audience addressed could do nothing about the situation, and the defendant
owed them no legal or moral duty. Since the statement was not made in the
exercise of his executive functions, the defendant could not avail himself of an
absolute privilege, and the defense of qualified privilege was not available
to the defendant because he had acted apart from his official duties.9
Recognizing that the absolute privilege accorded an official report or a
speech on the floor of the Legislature was absent, the minority opinion favored
a public policy that would allow a public officer, reporting to his constituents
concerning the administration of the business of the State, to be protected
by a qualified privilege. Unless qualified privilege is extended, informing the
public concerning governmental affairs will become difficult and dangerous.
However, if the public interest requires that the public be informed of
official acts, it equally requires that such information communicated, be truth-
ful, reasonable and reliable. A less strict application of qualified privilege
may foster ill-founded opinions, since truth is not a requisite to the privilege.
Truthful and reasonable opinions may be communicated to the public through
the privilege of fair comment, since such privilege provides the safeguards
essential to reliable information, for such opinions must be reasonably inferred
from true facts that in good faith are believed to be true.
JOINDER OF PARTIES UNDER SECTION 290-c OF TAx LAW
The certified question of whether a motion to sever a joint tax proceeding,
brought under Section 290-c of the New York Tax Law was properly granted
by the two lower courts was unanimously answered in the negative by the
Court of Appeals. The Court held that modern practice, in the interests
of mitigating expenses and facilitating justice, has become greatly liberalized
concerning joinder procedures.
8. Supra note 3.
9. Whether or not such a privilege exists is a matter of law to be decided by the
court. Byam v. Collins, supra note 5.
